Theories on Negligent Co-perpetrators: An Overview I by Lou, Jie
Abstract
Among the theoretical doctrines of negligent co-perpetrators, there are positive 
theories and negative theories on the existence of negligence co-perpetrators. The 
development of theories on negligent co-perpetrators has generally gone through four 
phases, during which the positive theory and the negative theory oppose each other 
all the time and prevail over each other alternately. This article intends to explore the 
evolution and present situation of research into the negligent co-perpetrators in 
criminal law theories by discussing the negative theory on co-perpetrators, with an 
aim to provide inspiration for the research on negligent co-perpetrators.
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Introduction
Among the theoretical doctrines of negligent co-perpetrators , there are 
positive theories and negative theories on the existence of negligence co-perpetrators. 
The development of theories on negligent co-perpetrators has generally gone through 
four phases , during which the positive theory and the negative theory oppose each 
other all the time and prevail over each other alternately. In the phase from the pre-
war to early post-war, the debate was focused on whether the concept of 
co-perpetrators of negligence could be established, and a mode involving complete 
opposition had been formed, i.e. the Doctrine of jointness in crime=the negative 
theory, the Doctrine of jointness in conduct=the positive theory. After 1970, a 
 Law distinguishes three categories of offenders ( ) a perpetrator is someone who pursues a 
criminal endeavor with at least one other confederate, sharing joint control over the operation; 
( ) an accomplice is someone who does not satisfy all the requirements for liability as 
described in the definition of the prescription but she/he nevertheless unlawfully and 
intentionally furthers the commission of the offence by somebody else; (3) an accessory after 
the fact is someone who unlawfully and intentionally, after the commission of the offence, 
assists a perpetrator or accomplice to escape liability. Grant, J. (2020). Chapter 19: Participation 
in crime | African Legal Information Institute. Retrieved 20 November 2020, from https://
africanlii.org/book/chapter-19-participation-crime.
Sometimes in academic theses, a perpetrator is described as principal offenders, also known as 
direct actual/main/direct perpetrator. However a distinction can be drawn between a direct and 
an indirect perpetrator. In this article, both direct and indirect perpetrators are included; therefore 
a co-perpetrator is used instead of a principal offender or others.
 On the 
division of phases for the evolution of theories on negligent co-perpetrators, also see
-
succession of practical cases recognized the negligent co-perpetrators; in the 
meanwhile, the new negligence theory came into being, which characterized the 
offence of negligence as the breach of duty of care, so the "the jointness of crime" 
may be construed as "jointly committing a conduct lacking duty of care", which 
alleviated the opposition between the doctrine of jointness in crime and the doctrine 
of jointness in conduct and made the doctrine of partial jointness in crime shift its 
position from the negative theory to the positive theory on co-perpetrators of 
negligence, thus the positive theory gradually becoming a dominant theory. 
Furthermore, among scholars of the positive theory, some advocating the doctrine of 
dissolution into spontaneous offences held that although negligent co-perpetrators 
could exist in terms of concept, there was no utility, so a case involving negligent 
co-perpetrators could be handled by recognizing spontaneous offences of negligence. 
In addition, the view of denying the possibility in the establishment of negligent 
co-perpetrators based on the doctrine of jointness in crime has always existed. This 
chapter intends to explore the evolution and present situation of research into the 
negligent co-perpetrators in criminal law theories by discussing the negative theory 
on co-perpetrators, with an aim to provide inspiration for the research on negligent 
co-perpetrators.
I the Negative Theory based on the Doctrine of Jointness in Crime
(1) Negative Theory based on the Doctrine of Jointness in Crime
The theory on negligent co-perpetrators in criminal law theories of Japan was 
originally developed in terms of the opposition between the doctrine of jointness in 
crime and the doctrine of jointness in conduct. Such mode of opposition, i.e. the 
doctrine of jointness in crime=the negative theory on negligent co-perpetrators, the 
doctrine of jointness in conduct=the positive theory, existed before the war and the 
 Theories on Negligent Co-perpetrators: An Overview I Lou Jie
early post-war period. Regarding what "jointness" refers to, the doctrine of jointness 
in crime held that co-offending means several persons jointly commit a specific 
crime, i.e. several persons convicted of one crime. According to the doctrine of 
jointness in crime, the actor must have knowledge of the consequence required in the 
actus reus, in other words, the jointness is reflected in the "intentional conduct", 
which means that each actor communicates intent on achieving a specific criminal 
result with each other; however, there is no such intentional conduct in the offence of 
negligence, so there are no negligent co-perpetrators. By contrast, the doctrine of 
jointness in conduct held that co-offending means several persons jointly perform 
conduct which has not been determined in terms of actus reus yet, and the 
communication of intent is satisfied when each actor has the common intent to 
perform such conduct, without the requirement of the common intention of a crime, 
so there could be co-perpetrators in an offence of negligence.
The theoretical foundation that used to deny the existence of negligent 
co-perpetrators is the doctrine of jointness in crime.  Takikawa Yukitoki, a 
representative scholar of such doctrine, considers that co-perpetratorship enjoy no 
unique nature in terms of physical element but a combination of conducts by 
co-perpetrators, which comprehensively supplement each other to satisfy the actus reus 
of a specific crime.  However, in terms of the mental element, the co-perpetratorship 
shows intrinsic characteristics, that is, each of co-perpetrators recognizes that his 
conduct is a supplement to other's conduct and supplemented by other's conduct. In 
other words, the resolution to achieve a consequence through conducts supplemented 
by each other is the characteristic of co-perpetrator, and such kind of mental state of 
 -
 -
mutual understanding only exists in intentional conduct, so co-perpetratorship is 
established on the premise of intention.  Although offenders of negligence may 
produce common negligent actions, they lack the resolution of intending to jointly 
cause a consequence by perpetrating partial conduct, so several persons who 
negligently satisfy the requirement of actus reus and cause the required consequence 
are regarded as separate offenders of negligence.  Shimomura Yasumasa also denies 
negligent co-perpetrators based on the doctrine of jointness in crime and holds that 
the essence of co-offending lies in the communication of intent to commit a crime, 
but the common intents of negligent perpetrators don't include the intent to jointly 
achieve the consequence, and they are just something common beyond the intent of 
the crime.  Although perpetrators negligently lack duty of care, they are independent 
mental phenomena of each perpetrator, so the jointness in conscious negligence could 
not be formed. According to the principle of culpability, the intent to perform a real 
act together is not sufficient to constitute a crime if the actor lacks the knowledge of 
such offence or the possibility to get such knowledge. Therefore, there exist no 
co-perpetrators in the offence of negligence.
If the doctrine of jointness in crime regards the joint crime as the common 
intentional crime, there are at least two problems as follows: (1) if we first limit the 
joint crime to the intentional crime and then deny the existence of the negligent joint 
crime because it is not an intentional crime, it is an expounding method with a 
preconceived conclusion to discuss the negligent joint crime by taking the intentional 
joint crime as the blueprint or the model. The negligent crime is a concept juxtaposed 
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developed from the intentional crime is not applicable to the negligent joint crime. (2) 
Formally, in terms of its concept only, the joint crime includes both intentional crime 
and negligent crime because the offence of negligence itself is a kind of crime, 
therefore, the situation where the perpetrators jointly commit negligent conducts 
should be regarded as the context of co-offending.
II the Negative Theory based on the Doctrine of the Subject with Common Intent
(1) the Doctrine of the Subject with Common Intent and the Theory on Negligent 
Co-perpetrators
From the perspective of the doctrine of the subject with common intent, there 
forms no the subject with the common intent to perpetrate conduct under a common 
purpose in the offence of negligence; thus the co-perpetrators are denied. The 
doctrine of the subject with common intent enjoys a similar theoretical foundation 
with the doctrine of jointness in crime. The representative scholars of the negative 
theory based on the doctrine of the subject with common intent include Kusano 
Hyoichiro, Saito Kinsaku and Nishihara Haruo, etc. Kusano Hyoichiro, the founder of 
the doctrine of the subject with common intent, believes that generally speaking, 
social phenomena may be created by an individual's conduct or joint conducts of 
several persons.  Such a phenomenon of jointness is reflected as a division of labour 
or contractual relationship in economics and the incorporative or cooperative system 
in civil and commercial law.  The observation of such a phenomenon from the 
perspective of criminal law produces the concept of co-offending.  It is a unique 




for achieving a common purpose.......it can be assumed that the legislation on 
co-offending is made in view of such special psycho-social phenomenon.  The 
feature of the doctrine of the subject with common intent is that more than two 
individuals with different mentality and physicality are integrated into one for 
achieving a common criminal purpose. However, such the subject with common 
intent is not a natural phenomenon but created by more than two persons through an 
agreement in order to commit a specific crime. Such an agreement is also called 
conspiracy or complicity.  Saito Kinsaku also holds that the feature of the doctrine 
of the subject with common intent is that more than two persons jointly commit a 
crime, therefore, firstly, there must exist a common purpose of intending to carry out 
a specific crime; secondly, under such purpose, more than two persons become one 
with the same mentality and physicality (the establishment of the subject with 
common intent), and then one of them is required to perpetrate the crime.  
Therefore, such special psycho-social phenomenon of establishing the subject with 
common intent can only exist in an intentional crime.
(2) Discussion on the doctrine of the subject with common intent
Although the doctrine of the subject with common intent answers the question 
of what is the foundation for criminal liabilities of co-perpetrators with conspiracy, 
there is a limitation in its theoretical basis; therefore negligent co-perpetrators may 
not be denied through the doctrine of the subject with common intent. Instead, the 
doctrine of the subject with common intent provides a theoretical foundation for 
co-perpetrators with conspiracy.  According to this doctrine, more than two persons, 
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integrate into the subject with common intent, so the conduct by any one of them is 
regarded as the conduct by the subject with common intent and all conspirers are 
convicted of co-offending. From the fact that the doctrine of the subject with common 
intent provides a theoretical basis, it could be said that such a doctrine is functional.
The doctrine of the subject with common intent has also been criticized. 
Firstly, the doctrine of the subject with common intent is based on the position of 
collective accountability and thus violates the principle of individual accountability 
established by modern criminal law.  Secondly, the doctrine of the subject with 
common intent regards a supra-individual subject (a subject beyond group members) 
as the legal subject, so the person who assumes responsibility for the consequence 
should be the supra-individual subject with common intent, however, according to 
this doctrine, the person who finally assumes criminal liability is individuals who 
produce the subject with common intent. There is a theoretical inconsistency here, 
and additionally, this will result in the transference of liability which violates the 
principle of accountability in the criminal law.  The doctrine of the subject with 
common intent provides a strong rebuttal to such criticism and holds that "full 
liability due to partial conduct" contained in the co-perpetratorship enjoys the same 
principle with the doctrine of the subject with common intent and the only difference 
 The co-perpetratorship with conspiracy refers to such situation as that more than two persons 
conspire to commit a crime and one or several of them perform the criminally prescribed 
conduct based on the previous conspiracy, but others who only take part in the conspiracy 
without performing the criminal conduct required in the actus reus are also regarded as 
co-perpetrators. Article 60 of the Criminal Law of Japan sets forth that more than two persons 
who jointly commit a crime are perpetrators, so there are huge controversies over whether to 
recognize the existence of co-perpetrators with conspiracy and how to demonstrate the 
legitimacy of the existence of co-perpetrators with conspiracy.
 
 
is that the group members of the supra-individual subject are not conspirers but 
perpetrators in the dominant doctrine.  "full liability due to partial conduct" requires 
each participant assume their own liabilities for the whole criminal conduct of the 
actus reus committed by a kind of supra-individual being.  Although the dominant 
doctrine emphasizes the principle of individual accountability, it indeed recognizes 
the supra-individual subject. The principles constituting the dominant doctrine and 
the doctrine of the subject with common intent are the same.
The author holds that although there is a phenomenon of collective 
accountability in the co-perpetratorship with conspiracy, this can only be regarded as 
a limited revision to the principle of individual accountability, so it cannot be 
generally applied to all situations of complicity. The "principle of full liability due to 
partial conduct" in the co-perpetratorship holds co-perpetrators liable for their 
conducts by regarding them as a whole. Although co-perpetratorship does not require 
everyone like an independent perpetrator to finish the whole crime through his own 
conduct, it in principle requires each participant commit partial conduct at least, 
otherwise the difference among perpetration, incitement and aiding can only be told 
according to the standard of playing a "significant role" which is not clear. Therefore, 
it is inappropriate for the doctrine of the subject with common intent to take the 
principle of collective accountability as the theoretical basis and implement it in the 
whole theory on the joint crime. To sum up, this argument from the standpoint of the 
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offenders cannot conspire to commit a specific crime and hardly establish the subject 
with common intent and thus negligent co-perpetrators are denied, because the 
existence of co-perpetratorship does not require the premise of establishing the 
subject with common intent, and this applies to both intentional co-perpetratorship 
and negligent co-perpetratorship.
III the Negative Theory on the basis of the Concept of Expanded Perpetrator
(1) Basic Views of the Concept of Expanded Perpetrator
In German criminal law theories, the negeligent co-perpetratorship is denied 
generally and the concept of expaned perpetrator is accepted. According to the 
expanded perpetrator concept, an idea is employed that any anctor who is 
instrumental in the realization of a crime is a perpetrator. The traditional theory on the 
joint crime distinguishes a perpetrator from an accomplice and takes the perpetrator 
as the basis, the participant who incites or aids the perpetrator is regarded as an 
accomplice. The perpetrator is the sentencing benchmark for an accomplice, so the 
latter is imposed upon the same punishment as the former or mitigated punishment. 
By contrast, the expaned perpetrator concept regards all persons who contribute to the 
offence as perpetrators and does not pay attention to the difference in the form of 
conduct that whether a participant directly commits a crime or commit incitement or 
aiding, instead, each participant's conduct is separately and independently taken into 
account to see whether it constitutes a crime.
The proposition that the expanded perpetrator concept is applicable to 
negligent offenders is originated from the “binary concept of a perpetrator” of Hans 
Welzel. Welzel considers that the offence of negligence is an incurred offence, to 
which the "incurred offence elements" applies.  The elements of an intentional 
offence by acts are different from the incurred elements of an offence of negligence; 
thus, it is incorrect to adopt the same co-perpetrator concept onto them.  The view 
that a perpetrator should be distinguished from an accomplice in the intentional 
offence is not necessarily suitable in the offence of negligence, that is to say, for the 
offence of intention, the restrictive perpetrator concept is adopted that distinguishes a 
perpetrator from an accomplice, by contrast, for an offence of negligence, the 
expanded concept of perpetrator is proper that the actor casually contributes to the 
consequence is the perpetrator in principle. Thus, we should distinguish different 
situations of intentional and negligent offences and adopt the binary perpetrator 
concept.  Welzel's such proposition is determined by the concept of purposeful act. 
Welzel holds that the purposeful (intentional) perpetrator is the dominator of the 
intent determination and commission of a crime; thus the distinguishment between a 
perpetrator and an accomplice should be made according to the existence or absence 
of the dominance over purposeful act.  The perpetrator is the person who dominates 
a crime by forming a purposeful intent. The accomplice, including an inciter and 
aider, just participates in the activity of other's dominance over a crime. However, all 
perpetrators in an offence of negligence are those who incur the consequence of 
satisfying the non-intentional offence elements through conducts violating the duty of 
care necessary for social life.  The offence of negligence is an incurred offence 
which incurs the consequence through conducts violating the duty of care necessary 
for social life and regards it as the basis for the perpetratorship. Therefore, the 
incurring of causation between the conduct and the consequence enjoys the 
 H. Welzel, Studien zum System des Strafrechts, ZSTW 58 (1939), S.491, quoted in
 
 -
 H. Welzel, Studien zum System des Strafrechts, ZStW. Bd. 58 (1939) S. 539-540, quoted in 
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perpetratorship regardless of the degree and modes such as directness and obliqueness 
of the reason incurring the consequence. As a result, there is no distinguishment 
between a perpetrator and an accomplice for a negligent offender.
(2) Problems Caused by the Concept of Expanded Perpetrator
There are some problems caused by adopting the concept of expanded perpetrator in 
an offence of negligence. The concept is based on the equivalence of conditions and 
thus results in unlimited expansion of the scope of the offence of negligence. 
Although Welzel points out that an actor is not guilty of his social-adequate conduct 
(conduct in compliance with the duty of care necessary in social life) resulting in the 
consequence despite incurring infringement upon legal interests.  The theory on the 
social adequacy seems able to limit the scope of the offence of negligence; however, 
according to such theory, if a reason goes beyond the degree of social adequacy, it is 
the reason resulting in the consequence no matter how small its causative potency, 
thus this theory cannot impose an effective limitation on the scope of the offence of 
negligence. In addition, in a situation where the causation between each person and 
the consequence is unclear, the unified perpetrator concept does not work, for 
example, in the Rolling Stone Case.  That is to say when it is clear that the conduct 
of a part of plural actors results in the consequence; however, it cannot be established 
which one's conduct results, in consequence, a separate examination of causation 
between each actor and the consequence on the basis of the expanded perpetrator 
concept will lead to a conclusion that all of them are not guilty according to the 
principle of in dubio pro reo. Therefore, it is difficult to delimit the scope of the 
offence of negligence by adopting the expanded perpetrator concept.
 H. Welzel, Studien zum System des Strafrechts, ZStW. Bd. 58 (1939) S. 558, quoted in
IV the Negative Theory on the basis of the Doctrine of Dissolution into Spontaneous Offence
Since the1990s, the doctrine of dissolution into spontaneous offence for the 
negligent offence has become gradually popular, which considers that the 
psychological causation as the theoretical basis for "full liability due to partial 
conduct" is too weak to support the establishment of co-perpetrators. Just as stated 
below, when the negligent co-perpetratorship is demonstrated by such objective 
jointness in conduct as "common violation of common duty", it fails to provide a 
reasonable explanation to the jointness in a mental state of co-perpetrators. There 
arises a doubt in the boundary between negligent co-perpetrators and spontaneous 
offences of negligence under the situation of paying little attention to the jointness in 
subjective elements. The doctrine of dissolution through spontaneous offences of 
 The facts of this case: In the evening of 21 April 1983, two men (A and B) were on their way 
home from their cabin in the Toss river valley near Zurich. They spotted two big stones 
(individually weighing 52 kg and 100 kg) at the top of the slope so steep that the bottom was not 
visible. They decided to roll these stones down the slope. A pushed the 52 kg stone down the 
hill, whilst B pushed the heavier, 100 kg stone. One of these stones struck and killed a fisherman 
at the foot of the slope. However, it could not be established which of the two stones had killed 
him.
The judgment of Rolling Stone Case is: When the case came before the Supreme Court, the 
judges held that A and B were criminally liable as co-offenders for negligent homicide. Up until 
that ruling, the notion of co-offending was strictly limited to intentional crimes. This seemed 
logical because the conventional view of co-offending generally requires the existence of a 
conspiracy: at least two persons who embark on a common criminal pursuit. However, in the 
“rolling stones” case there was no joint decision (conspiracy) to kill a fisherman. By deciding to 
roll the stones down the slope, A and B jointly engaged in grossly negligent behavior that caused 
the death of the fisherman. The Supreme Court ruling was an attempt to overcome problems of 
evidence by employing the tools of the substantive criminal law. The judgement and the facts of 
the case please see:Thommen, M. (2018). Introduction to Swiss Law (p. 390). Berlin; Bern: Carl 
Grossmann Verlag.
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negligence is roughly divided into two categories. The one denies the possibility of 
establishing negligent co-perpetrators, that is to say, it denies the concept of negligent 
co-perpetrators through the interpretation of communication of intent; the other only 
denies the utility of negligent co-perpetrators and holds that the spontaneous offences 
of negligence may be established in the situation of common violation of common 
duty, so it is superfluous to create the concept of co-perpetrators.
(1) On Denying the Possibility of Establishing the Concept of Negligent 
Co-perpetrators
The view of denying the possibility of establishing negligent co-perpetrators 
criticizes the doctrine of "common violation of common duty" for only paying 
attention to the objective jointness in the perpetration of criminally prescribed 
conduct and ignoring the subjective element.  If the physical causation -- the 
coincidence (simultaneous commission) of perpetration of criminally prescribed 
conducts -- is regarded as the only basis for co-perpetrators, the difference between 
co-perpetratorship and spontaneous offences will disappear. Therefore, the 
co-perpetratorship is established on the premise of subjective elements reflecting 
psychological causation such as communication of intent and common plan, and there 
is no exception to negligent co-perpetrators. However, a negligent offender is 
 The Doctrine of common violation of common duty was proposed by Claus Roxin and 
became a strong point of view as the theoretical basis for the positive theory on negligent 
co-perpetrators in Japan. Such doctrine means that in the situation of jointly carrying out the 
conduct containing a high risk of producing a specific consequence, each one of co-conductors 
is imposed on the common duty of care to prevent the consequence, and when each one makes 
the criminal consequence occur due to joint conduct violating the common duty of care, the 
negligence as an element of negligent co-perpetrators may be established because thea 
consequence as an element of the offence of negligence is incurred by jointly committing such 
offence of negligence.
unaware of the consequence; thus, such mental causation at the subjective level 
doesn't exist; thus, the negligent co-perpetratorship is denied. For example, Takahashi 
Norio considers that the sanction norms derive the attribution of the consequence 
while rules of conduct derive reciprocal attribution of conducts.  Because rules of 
conduct are related to the conduct expectation of the general people, judgment should 
be made in advance.  Based on the common plan, the actor has a certain expectation 
of the consequence caused by his own conduct and is able to control his status and 
role in the criminal enterprise.  In this regard, the basis for the reciprocal attribution 
of conducts is established.  The foundation for punishing co-perpetrators is that 
despite only committing partial conduct, each one should assume full liability through 
reciprocal attribution of conducts based on the significance of the status and role of 
each one's conduct in the realization of a conspired crime.  Therefore, each 
perpetrator cannot control his status and role in the enterprise without advance 
knowledge of the consequence. In other words, if actors have no knowledge of the 
negligent consequence of committing illegally dangerous conduct, the reciprocal 
attribution of conducts (violation of rules of conduct) cannot be made. The basis for 
the liability of co-perpetrators is the existence of such conspiracy formed by the 
knowledge of a joint crime; however, there is no such conspiracy for the 
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co-perpetrators is denied. He also advocates the adoption of the unified perpetrator 
concept in the offence of negligence, that is to say, there should be no distinction 
between a perpetrator and an accomplice in the offence of negligence and each actor 
should be regarded as a perpetrator by separately determining the perpetratorship of 
all actors.  The understanding on the content of the common duty such as the duty 
to "take care of other companion's conduct because it is not enough for each actor 
simply take care of his own conduct", one's duty to "take care of the other's conduct" 
may be dissolved in the "spontaneous perpetrators with negligence in mutual 
supervision" in most cases.
Ida Makoto also holds this point of view that in a case of an offence of 
negligence, since there is no agreement of the realization of the consequence, there is 
no assertion of joint liability for the consequence on the ground of such agreement.  
Whether there exists negligence has always been determined individually for each 
actor and the principle of "full liability due to partial conduct" cannot be applied for 
specific conduct commonly committed only. As for an offence of negligence, as long 
as the adequate causation between the conduct and the consequence is determined, 
the actor can be held criminally liable as an independent negligent offender for the 
consequence even though the consequence occurs through the medium of other's 
negligent conduct. In this regard, there is an essential difference between a negligent 
offence and an intentional offence. In the case of an intentional offence, when other's 
intentional conduct serves as an intermediary for causing the consequence, the 
attribution of consequence to each actor as a perpetrator should be determined 




The above-mentioned negative views deduce the inexistence of the concept of 
negligent co-perpetrators from the interpretation of communication of intent, that is to 
say, unlike an intentional offender, a negligent offender does not have the intent to 
realize the criminal purpose, so negligent offenders cannot communicate intent 
among them or produce common intent, then a joint crime cannot be constituted. In 
fact, the issue of whether negligent offenders have communication of intent or not has 
always been one of the heated disputes in theory on negligent co-perpetrators. 
Furthermore, the answer to the issue of whether there is mental causation in the form 
of communication of intent in an offence of negligence determines the subsequent 
development direction of the theory.
(2) Negating the Necessity for the Existence of Co-perpetrators
In previous doctrines, the doctrine of jointness in crime is opposed to the 
doctrine of jointness in conduct, and the former considers the joint intention 
necessary and thus denies the co-perpetrators in an offence of negligence, while the 
latter recognizes the co-perpetrators in an offence of negligence. However, nowadays, 
the doctrine of jointness in partial crime  holds that as long as 
actors jointly commit the prescribed conduct of a negligent offence, they may 
constitute negligent co-perpetrators.  The view of affirming negligent 
co-perpetrators has become dominant, and the focus of discussion has shifted to the 
question that in what situations negligent co-perpetrators could be determined. The 
 
 -
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current dominant view in Japan is that when several actors utilize and supplement 
each other in undertaking the common duty of care, and commit the joint conduct of 
failure to perform their duty of care, the establishment of negligent co-perpetrators 
can be determined.
The doctrine denying the above-mentioned dominant one is another strong 
point of view. Its foundation is not the old negative theory (denying the possibility of 
establishing negligent co-perpetrators). Instead, on the one hand, it recognizes the 
possibility of establishing negligent co-perpetrators in theory, on the other hand, it 
advocates that based on the dominant view of "common violation of common duty", 
the case of several negligent offenders may be settled as a case of spontaneous 
offences of negligence (dissolved in the spontaneous offences), so there is no need to 
recognize negligent co-perpetrators and the recognizance of co-perpetrators in an 
offence of negligence possibly lead to excessive punishment.  Nishida Noriyuki 
holds that after all it just establishes a kind of supervisory negligence based on the 
 
-
 Takahashi Noria proposes 
that the mutually supplemental relationship between actors is significant only in the case of an 
intentional offence. Because in the case of an intentional offence, each actor's criminal intent is 
enhanced to amplify the risk of the occurrence of the consequence due to the existence of such 
mutual supplemental relationship, but negligent offenders are unconscious of the consequence. 
Furthermore, the practice of applying the restrictive perpetrator concept to an offence of 
negligence on the one hand and expanding punishment by means of recognizing negligent 
co-perpetrators under certain circumstances, on the other hand is contradictory. 
duty of mutual supervision at the horizontal level and it is sufficient to establish 
spontaneous offences of negligence if that is all...... . In addition, Maeda Masahiide 
believes that to recognize co-perpetrators in practice may provide an argumentative 
advantage, for example, avoiding the judgment of specific causation, however instead 
there will arise new issues such as the determination of "joint negligence" which are 
as difficult as the demonstration of specific causation.
(3) Discussion on the Doctrine of Dissolution into Spontaneous Offence
The first thing to be discussed is the practical significance of recognizing 
negligent co-perpetrators. The author holds that negligent co-perpetrators cannot be 
treated as spontaneous offenders of a negligent crime even though the former is 
limited to the situation of "common violation of common duty". The doctrine of 
dissolution into spontaneous offence for the negligent offence understands "common 
violation of common duty" as that each actor has not only the duty to prevent his own 
conduct from causing the consequence but also the duty to supervise others 
committing the joint conduct and prevent them from causing the consequence. Both 
the duty of taking care of one's own conduct and the duty to supervise others' 
conducts are in essence one's own objective duty of care, so a violation of such duty 
should be treated as an independent perpetrator. For example, the Tokyo District 
Court made a judgment for the Setagaya Cable Incident  on 23 January 1992 that 
each negligent actor in "common violation of common duty" is "dissolved into 
spontaneous offenders with negligence in mutual supervision". The problem of such 
point of view is not limited to this case. When actors in a case are horizontally 
cooperative, that is to say, actors are equal in status to finish the divided work, it is 
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hard to determine that actors are in supervisory positions, so the duty to take care of 
other's conduct cannot be established. The supervisory and regulatory negligence in 
the criminal theory refers to that the supervisor or regulator is responsible for 
supervision and regulation but fails to perform such duty and thus cause the 
consequence of infringing upon legal interests. The supervisory or regulatory 
negligence exists on the premise that the supervisor and the supervised are in a 
hierarchical relationship. If actors are not in a hierarchical relationship, it is unable to 
determine the supervisory relationship and regard it as supervisory negligence; thus it 
is unable to hold actors criminally liable as perpetrators for violating their duty of 
preventing others from committing criminal conducts.  In addition, it is of practical 
significance to recognize co-perpetrators of an offence of negligence because in a 
 The court issued a judgment that two 
defendants jointly engaged in the work of melting the lead tube and expose the inside cable by 
the flame of the welding torches to connect telephone cables; the duties of care of two 
defendants are to mutually confirm the extinguishment of the flame of two welding torches and 
to jointly prevent fire from happening. However, two defendants failed to perform their duties of 
care and left the working site together. Due to their negligence, one of two welding torches was 
in the state of lighting up in a small flame which caused a fire burning the telephone cables and 
producing public danger. To sum up, it was determined that they were convicted of the crime of 
negligently causing a fire in the course of service as co-perpetrators. The judgment held that 
……when it is predicted like this case that dangerous and serious consequence will happen in 
social life, co-operators assume the common duty of care due to mutual utilization and 
supplementation, and when co-operators commit the joint conduct of failing to perform the duty 
of care, all of the co-operators are determined as co-perpetrators of an offence of negligence and 
all actors as the co-perpetrators assume criminal liability for all consequences.
 Furthermore, such situation is only regarded as a kind of aid to the omission in an intentional 
offence, but according to the Doctrine of dissolution into spontaneous offence, a negligent 
offender will be upgraded as a perpetrator, which is not proper. It is generally believed that the 
negligent incitement and aiding are not culpable, but according to the Doctrine of dissolution 
into spontaneous offence, it constitutes an independent negligent perpertratorship, which will 
undoubtedly expand the scope of punishment.
case that several persons jointly make a decision resulting in the harmful 
consequence, if a co-perpetrating relationship is not recognized, it is hard to 
recognize the causation between the conduct of decision and the consequence or the 
possibility of avoiding the consequence. For example, in the case that all directors 
unanimously decide to sell defective goods, it is hard to determine the "but-for" 
relation between each approver and the consequence. However, if they are regarded 
as co-perpetrators, such determination can be made.
V Summary-- Communication of Intent and Co-perpetratorship
The Doctrine of Jointness in Crime regards the joint crime as the common 
intentional crime, raising the problem of the preconceived conclusion to discuss the 
negligent joint crime by taking the intentional joint crime as the blueprint or the 
model, neglecting negligent crime as a concept juxtaposed with rather than 
subordinate to the intentional crime, so the standard for co-offending developed from 
the intentional crime is not applicable to the negligent joint crime. Although the 
Doctrine of the Subject with Common Intent answers the question of what the 
foundation for criminal liabilities of co-perpetrators with conspiracy is, the 
phenomenon of collective accountability in the co-perpetratorship with conspiracy 
can only be regarded as a limited revision to the principle of individual 
accountability, so it cannot be generally applied to all situations of complicity. The 
Unified Perpetrator Concept which is based on the equivalence of conditions, in 
spite of the further introduction of the theory of social adequacy, it results in 
unlimited expansion of the scope of the offence of negligence. In addition, in a 
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situation where the causation between each actor and the consequence is unclear, the 
unified perpetrator concept does not work. The doctrine of dissolution into 
spontaneous offence overlooks the premise for the actor assuming the responsibility 
of supervision and regulation. If actors are not in a hierarchical relationship, it is 
unable to determine the supervisory relationship and regard it as supervisory 
negligence; thus it is unable to hold actors criminally liable as perpetrators for 
violating their duty of preventing others from committing criminal conducts.
Thr oughou t nega t ive theo r ie s , the d i scuss ion a bout neg l igent 
co-perpetratorship is modelled on the theory of intentional co-perpetratorship. That is, 
"common intent to perform common conduct" is used as a critical element to 
determine co-perpetratorship is established. "Common intent of common conduct" 
means that each actor communicates intent on achieving a specific criminal result 
with each other; thus malicious (intentional) is a necessity, and there exist no 
co-perpetrators in the offence of negligence. Despite that the postwar "jointness in 
crime" doctrine shift the attention to "jointness in conduct", downplaying the 
requirement of communication of mutual criminal intent for co-perpetratorship 
establishment it still developed the doctrine of dissolution into spontaneous offence 
for the negligent offence based on questioning the looseness of communication of 
intent. In short, the theory on negligent co-perpetrators in criminal law theories of 
Japan was originally developed in terms of the opposition between the doctrine of 
jointness in crime and the doctrine of jointness in conduct and then continued to 
advance theories of negligent co-perpetrators based on different attitudes towards the 
communication of intent.
